

AD-A070 634

IBM FEDERAL SYSTEMS DIV HOUSTON TX

F/G 9/2

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM ORBITER AVION--ETC(U)

APR 79 L S DIAMANT, E W SMYTHE, R H WOLFE

F04701-76-C-0271

UNCLASSIFIED

RES-78-11-1

SAMSO-TR-79-37


NL

| OF |
AD
A070634



END
DATE
FILMED
8-79

DDC



MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART
NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS-1963-A


ED

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
ORBITER AVIONICS SOFTWARE INTEGRATION STUDY

2 BS

IBM

ADA070634



APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

SPECIAL STUDY REPORT -
"ANALYSIS OF ORBITER SYSTEMS
TO MEET MASE REQUIREMENTS"

CDRL 011A5

17 APRIL 1979

⑧ SANSO

⑨ TR-79-37

⑭

RES-78-11-1

⑥

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
SPACE TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
ORBITER AVIONICS SOFTWARE INTEGRATION STUDY.

ANALYSIS OF ORBITER SYSTEMS TO MEET MASE REQUIREMENTS.

⑨ Special study kept. Feb-Apr 79

CDRL 011A5

CONTRACT NO. ⑮ F04701-76-C-0271

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE

DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED

REF ID: A66666
JUN 27 1979
C

⑩

L.S. Diamant,
E. W. Smythe
R. H. Wolfe, Jr

IBM

FEDERAL SYSTEMS DIVISION
HOUSTON, TEXAS

⑪

17 APR 1979

⑫

61 p.

PREPARED FOR
SPACE AND MISSILE SYSTEMS ORGANIZATION
AIR FORCE SYSTEMS COMMAND
P. O. BOX 92960, WORLDWAY POSTAL CENTER
LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA 90009

411 250

4/B

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER SAMSO-TR-79-37	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) DoD STS Orbiter Avionics Software Integration Study: Analysis of Orbiter Systems to Meet Manned Aerospace Support Equipment (MASE) Requirements.		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Special Study Report FEB-APR 1979
7. AUTHOR(s) DIAMANT, L.S. SMYTHE, E.W. WOLFE, R. H. JR.		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER RES-78-11-1
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES (IBM) FEDERAL SYSTEMS DIVISION HOUSTON, TX		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s) F04701-76-C-0271 <i>New</i>
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS DYI/MAJ JUND HQ SAMSO, P.O. BOX 92960, WORLDWAY POSTAL CENTER LOS ANGELES, CA. 90009		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE 17 APRIL 79
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 60
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) UNCLASSIFIED
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report) UNLIMITED (DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A)		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) Astronaut Applications , Space Shuttle Software Applications Manned Aerospace Support Equipment (MASE), Space Shuttle Avionics, Sortie Support System, Space Transportation System (STS), Space Shuttle, Space Test Program, Space Applications. Space Shuttle Software.		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) This study analyzes the use of the Space Shuttle Orbiter data processing sub-systems in satisfying requirements for the integral astronaut participation in selected DoD space shuttle experiments. Key aspect of the study was the analysis, based on system implementation, to determine degrees of data protection from unauthorized use. Typical image processing and enhancing techniques versus display response time for astronaut interactions were assessed. The study concluded that a degree of data protection is achieved with the present orbiter avionics... (continued on reverse side)		

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

7E-PT-PT-ORVAR

↑
Manned Aircraft Support Equipment

ms. always of Orbiter Systems Co

space Support Equipment (MASE) Re-

• S. J. TAMMAYO

W. F. SUTHERS

REF ID: A67478

XP MOTIVATION

CPAGE TEST PROGRAM 24MS01/DT

(72FA) 0080-240T2Y2 91122TM 01A 2CAZ BO

P.O. BOX 92960, WORLDWAY POSTAL CENTER, LOS ANGELES CA 90009

UNCLASSIFIED

UNLIMITED (DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A)

(A) THE STATE OF TEXAS, COUNTY OF DALLAS, DISTRICT OF SOUTHERN

Space Test Program, Space Applications,
Space Shuttle Software,
Orbit Support System, Space Transportation System (STS), Space Shuttle,
Manned Aerospace Support Equipment (MASE), Space Shuttle Avionics,
Astronaut Applications, Space Shuttle Software Applications

This study analyzes the use of the Space Shuttle Orbiter data processing subsystem in satisfying requirements for the integral astronaut participation in selected HDB space shuttle experiments. Key aspects of the study was the analysis based on system implementation, to determine degree of data protection from unauthorized use required. Typical types image processing and enhancing versus display response time for astronaut interactions were assessed. The study concluded that maximum security is achieved with the present orbiter hardware.

(continued on reverse side)

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

RESPONSIBILITY. The controlling DoD office will be responsible for completion of the Report Documentation Page, DD Form 1473, in all technical reports prepared by or for DoD organizations.

CLASSIFICATION. Since this Report Documentation Page, DD Form 1473, is used in preparing announcements, bibliographies, and data banks, it should be unclassified if possible. If a classification is required, identify the classified items on the page by the appropriate symbol.

COMPLETION GUIDE

General. Make Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 13, 15, and 16 agree with the corresponding information on the report cover. Leave Blocks 2 and 3 blank.

Block 1. Report Number. Enter the unique alphanumeric report number shown on the cover.

Block 2. Government Accession No. Leave Blank. This space is for use by the Defense Documentation Center.

Block 3. Recipient's Catalog Number. Leave blank. This space is for the use of the report recipient to assist in future retrieval of the document.

Block 4. Title and Subtitle. Enter the title in all capital letters exactly as it appears on the publication. Titles should be unclassified whenever possible. Write out the English equivalent for Greek letters and mathematical symbols in the title (see "Abstracting Scientific and Technical Reports of Defense-sponsored RDT/E," AD-667 000). If the report has a subtitle, this subtitle should follow the main title, be separated by a comma or semicolon if appropriate, and be initially capitalized. If a publication has a title in a foreign language, translate the title into English and follow the English translation with the title in the original language. Make every effort to simplify the title before publication.

Block 5. Type of Report and Period Covered. Indicate here whether report is interim, final, etc., and, if applicable, inclusive dates of period covered, such as the life of a contract covered in a final contractor report.

Block 6. Performing Organization Report Number. Only numbers other than the official report number shown in Block 1, such as series numbers for in-house reports or a contractor/grantee number assigned by him, will be placed in this space. If no such numbers are used, leave this space blank.

Block 7. Author(s). Include corresponding information from the report cover. Give the name(s) of the author(s) in conventional order (for example, John R. Doe or, if author prefers, J. Robert Doe). In addition, list the affiliation of an author if it differs from that of the performing organization.

Block 8. Contract or Grant Number(s). For a contractor or grantee report, enter the complete contract or grant number(s) under which the work reported was accomplished. Leave blank in in-house reports.

Block 9. Performing Organization Name and Address. For in-house reports enter the name and address, including office symbol, of the performing activity. For contractor or grantee reports enter the name and address of the contractor or grantee who prepared the report and identify the appropriate corporate division, school, laboratory, etc., of the author. List city, state, and ZIP Code.

Block 10. Program Element, Project, Task Area, and Work Unit Numbers. Enter here the number code from the applicable Department of Defense form, such as the DD Form 1498, "Research and Technology Work Unit Summary" or the DD Form 1634, "Research and Development Planning Summary," which identifies the program element, project, task area, and work unit or equivalent under which the work was authorized.

Block 11. Controlling Office Name and Address. Enter the full, official name and address, including office symbol, of the controlling office. (Equates to funding/sponsoring agency. For definition see DoD Directive 5200.20, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents.")

Block 12. Report Date. Enter here the day, month, and year or month and year as shown on the cover.

Block 13. Number of Pages. Enter the total number of pages.

Block 14. Monitoring Agency Name and Address (if different from Controlling Office). For use when the controlling or funding office does not directly administer a project, contract, or grant, but delegates the administrative responsibility to another organization.

Blocks 15 & 15a. Security Classification of the Report: Declassification/Downgrading Schedule of the Report. Enter in 15 the highest classification of the report. If appropriate, enter in 15a the declassification/downgrading schedule of the report, using the abbreviations for declassification/downgrading schedules listed in paragraph 4-207 of DoD 5200.1-R.

Block 16. Distribution Statement of the Report. Insert here the applicable distribution statement of the report from DoD Directive 5200.20, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents."

Block 17. Distribution Statement (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from the distribution statement of the report). Insert here the applicable distribution statement of the abstract from DoD Directive 5200.20, "Distribution Statements on Technical Documents."

Block 18. Supplementary Notes. Enter information not included elsewhere but useful, such as: Prepared in cooperation with ... Translation of (or by) ... Presented at conference of ... To be published in ...


Block 19. Key Words. Select terms or short phrases that identify the principal subjects covered in the report, and are sufficiently specific and precise to be used as index entries for cataloging, conforming to standard terminology. The DoD "Thesaurus of Engineering and Scientific Terms" (TEST), AD-672 000, can be helpful.

Block 20. Abstract. The abstract should be a brief (not to exceed 200 words) factual summary of the most significant information contained in the report. If possible, the abstract of a classified report should be unclassified and the abstract to an unclassified report should consist of publicly-releasable information. If the report contains a significant bibliography or literature survey, mention it here. For information on preparing abstracts see "Abstracting Scientific and Technical Reports of Defense-Sponsored RDT&E," AD-667 000.

This study was conducted for DOD/SAMSO in accordance with the Statement of Work for the DOD Space Transportation System Orbiter Avionics Software Study. This technical report is submitted as partial fulfillment of Contract F04701-76-C-0271 and as a specific response to CDRL Item 011A5.

The study was conducted under the direction of DOD/SAMSO with The Aerospace Corporation providing technical assistance to SAMSO. This report was prepared by the International Business Machines Corporation, Federal Systems Division, of Houston, Texas. The period of performance of the report was from 26 February 1979 to 17 April 1979 inclusive, under the contract period of 1 October 1978 to 30 March 1980.

This report has been reviewed and approved. Readers are cautioned that the material herein represents the views of IBM only and does not necessarily define a DOD/SAMSO position, policy nor decision.



ROBERT M. GATES, Major, USAF
Manager, DOD Orbiter Avionics Software
Space Transportation SPO

Accession For	
NTIS	GR&I
DDC	TAB
Unannounced	
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Availand/or special
A	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>Section</u>	<u>Page</u>
1.0 INTRODUCTION	1-1
1.1 Purpose	1-1
1.2 Scope	1-1
2.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	2-1
2.1 Background	2-1
2.2 Security	2-3
2.3 Experiment Data Processing	2-3
2.4 GPC-Oriented System Response	2-3
2.5 Microprocessor-Augmented System Response	2-3
2.6 Key Points	2-4
3.0 GPC ISOLATION AND SECURITY	3-1
3.1 Description of the Problem	3-1
3.2 Data Flow	3-1
3.3 Isolation Techniques	3-4
3.3.1 Start-Up Methodology	3-4
3.3.2 Isolation Of Data On DOD Buses	3-5
3.3.3 Transmission Of DOD Data On Unauthorized Buses	3-6
3.3.4 Primary Mass Memory Interface	3-6
3.3.5 Telemetry Interface	3-7
3.3.6 Unauthorized/Unplanned Use Of DOD Mass Memory	3-7
3.3.7 Summary And Conclusion Regarding Isolation	3-7
3.4 Effect Of Synchronization	3-8
3.5 TEMPEST Considerations	3-8
3.6 Multi-Experiment Support	3-8
3.7 Ground Systems	3-9
4.0 EXPERIMENT DATA PROCESSING	4-1
4.1 Approach	4-1
4.2 Data Processing Requirements	4-3
4.2.1 Contrast Enhancement	4-3
4.2.2 Demagnification	4-4
4.2.3 Magnification	4-4
4.2.4 Image Rotation	4-8
4.2.5 Fourier Transform	4-8
4.2.6 Synthetic Aperture Radar Image Forming	4-9
4.2.7 Requirements Summary	4-9
4.3 Processing Systems Configurations	4-12
4.3.1 The Baseline System	4-12
4.3.2 Video-Augmented System	4-12
4.3.3 Buffer-Augmented System	4-14
4.4 GPC-Oriented System Response	4-14

TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONTINUED)

<u>Section</u>	<u>Page</u>
5.0 HIGH RESPONSE SYSTEM	5-1
5.1 Microprocessor-Augmented System	5-1
5.2 Technology Overview	5-1
5.2.1 Memories	5-4
5.2.2 Microprocessors	5-7
5.3 Microprocessor-Augmented System	5-7
6.0 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	6-1
6.1 Security	6-1
6.2 System Response	6-2
7.0 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS	7-1
8.0 REFERENCES	8-1

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

<u>Figure</u>	<u>Page</u>
2-1 Dedicated GPC/MMU System	2-2
3-1 GPC I/O Functional Diagram	3-2
3-2 HAL/S Isolation Feature	3-10
4-1 Steps In The Specification Of Onboard User Requirements And Their Impacts On System Specification	4-2
4-2 Histogram Compensation For Contrast Enhancement	4-5
4-3 Image Demagnification Alternatives	4-6
4-4 Image Magnification Alternatives	4-7
4-5 Baseline System	4-11
4-6 DEU Capability For Image Display	4-13
4-7 Video-Augmented System	4-15
4-8 Buffer-Augmented System	4-16
4-9 GPC Response As A Function Of Experiment Data Rate	4-17
4-10 GPC Response As A Function Of Image Size	4-19
4-11 Image Size - Data Rate Tradeoff	4-20
5-1 Microprocessor-Augmented System	5-2
5-2 Memory Technologies	5-3
5-3 Access/Cost Comparisons	5-5
5-4 Cycle Time/Cost Comparisons	5-6
5-5 Air/Space Computer Projections	5-8
5-6 Prototype Disk Memory	5-9
5-7 Microprocessor-Augmented System Performance	5-11

Table

4-1 Requirements Impacts On Processing	4-10
--	------

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Purpose

The purpose of performing the Special Study described in this document is twofold. Both aspects, however, are intended to analyze the use of the Space Shuttle Orbiter data processing systems in satisfying those requirements placed on the Manned Aerospace Support Equipment (MASE) by the Space Test Programs' (STP) Five-year Plan.

The first aspect is an analysis of the techniques involved and the security associated with isolating one of the Orbiter's General Purpose Computers (GPCs) for use as the MASE central processing unit. The second is an investigation as to how responsive such a system would be to the typical kinds of data processing one might expect on experiments assumed to be of interest to the STP.

The results and conclusions presented in this document do not represent a recommendation by the DOD or IBM on the MASE systems architecture, but, rather, an objective analysis of the Orbiter's systems as applied to the problem.

1.2 Scope

This document is intended to accomplish the purpose discussed above by addressing the following topics. Section 2 is an Executive Summary which includes some background as well as major points of interest and conclusions.

Section 3 addresses the security aspects associated with isolating one of the Orbiter's five General Purpose Computers (GPC) for the purpose of supporting sortie mission data processing. Standard measures available within the current Orbiter's capabilities as well as additional security measures which can be taken are addressed.

Section 4 develops typical data processing requirements for experiments assumed to be of interest to the Department of Defense (DOD). The section continues by analyzing the application of the isolated GPC to those requirements in terms of response time. Some necessary augmentation of the current system to handle high data rate input and video imagery is discussed.

Section 5 goes on to analyze a system where the GPC is replaced by a spaceborne microprocessor of capabilities projected for the 1985-1990 timeframe. Improvements in the speed of response are presented as functions of two configurations of the system.

Section 6 presents a set of conclusions and recommendations.

For additional information relative to the Orbiter Data Processing System (DPS), the reader is referred to "Software Engineering for Shuttle Payloads" (NAS 5-25370, January 1979). This document, specifically Appendix J, gives a broad description of the DPS and payload interface.

2.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2.1 Background

The study presented in this document was prompted from a review of the Five-Year Plan for Space Test Program, 28 August 1978. During this review by IBM, it was noted that the Space Shuttle Orbiter's data processing system components were not under consideration as candidate elements in the Manned Aerospace Support Equipment (MASE) system since the Sortie Concept addressed "stand-alone" systems for quick response, flexibility and security. Discussions with STP personnel resulted in a briefing by IBM on the potential applicability of Orbiter equipment to support MASE. A review of the hardware and software available and a technique for isolating one of the Orbiter's General Purpose Computers (GPC) resulted in the configuration shown in Figure 2-1.

In this configuration, GPC #2 (taken as a representative one of five) is functionally isolated from the others and is electrically connected to the experiment pallet and experiments over the Launch Data Buses (LDB). One of the GPCs (in this case, number 2) and the LDBs are usually dormant during on-orbit operations and may be used for this purpose.* The same is true of the Display/Keyboard (DK) bus. For on-orbit operations, Multi-Functional CRT Display System (MCDS) number 1 is not normally used. Since all computers, displays and buses are cross-strapped, any configuration of elements is possible. A fifth MCDS modified for video is added at the Aft Flight Deck and is dedicated for MASE purposes. A third Mass Memory Unit (MMU) with potential of an intermediate encryptor/decryptor is supplied for additional security of DOD software and data. Uplink, time and data stored in the remaining computer will be made available at the aft station by NASA as a standard service.

The briefing prompted a Special Study to be performed under the Orbiter Avionics System Integration Study contract held between DOD (LVJ) and IBM. This study was to investigate the security aspects of the suggested configuration and the applicability of this system to typical DOD experiment processing requirements. This document presents the results of that study.

*For OFT, GPC#2 may be used as a backup GN&C computer during powered-flight maneuvers on-orbit. We assume that in the mature OPS timeframe this will not be necessary, or that if it is necessary, experiment data processing would not be performed during powered flight. As for the Launch Data Buses (LDB), they would only be used to operate the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) on-orbit. It is assumed that either the DOD would not use the RMS or would suspend payload data processing during RMS operations.




Figure 2-1 Dedicated GPC/MMU System

2.2 Security

An analysis was performed to determine the techniques and security risk associated with isolating 1) the DOD GPC from the rest, 2) the remaining four GPCs from the DOD GPC and its data buses, 3) both systems from the other's Mass Memories and 4) the DOD GPC from the Orbiter's telemetry stream. Standard error control measures in the GPCs, the isolation effects of causing the DOD GPC to become "out of sync" with the remaining set and some special measures which might be taken to increase security were reviewed. It was determined currently-available measures in the Orbiter's data processing system would provide at least three levels of depth in system-to-system isolation.

A review of the TEMPEST testing program was given. No regard to internal (to the Orbiter) testing has been given, but TEMPEST problems are not expected due to "sound electromagnetic interference practices" being employed during Orbiter construction.

Multi-experiment handling in the GPC was discussed and an available software technique to separate programs and data was presented.

2.3 Experiment Data Processing

Experiment data processing requirements for digital imagery and Synthetic Aperture Radars (SAR) were generated (Section 4). Contrast enhancement, magnification/demagnification, Fourier transforming and SAR image forming were considered. After a description of the processes, actual processing requirements were presented.

2.4 GPC-Oriented System Response

The ability of the system described in Section 2.1 to meet the requirements generated in Section 4 is presented. It is shown that with proper augmentation to handle video and high-speed buffering of experiment data, most presumed processing requirements could be handled at reasonable rates. For example, the problem of reducing a 1024^2 digital time image to a 512^2 for video display requires around 16 seconds. The same problem on data transformed by a Fast Fourier Transform requires around one minute.

2.5 Microprocessor-Augmented System Response

A system wherein the GPC is replaced by a microprocessor whose characteristics are estimated from computer technology projections is discussed in Section 5. Technological predictions for processors and memory devices were surveyed and two systems

analyzed: One where the mass storage device is arrayed to the point that the microprocessor becomes saturated and the other - a more simple and less costly system - where a single state-of-the-art spaceborne memory is used where the microprocessor is then matched in speed with the memory. Predicted systems response (as compared to the GPC-oriented system) becomes:

<u>Function</u>	<u>GPC System</u>	<u>Single Memory System</u>	<u>Arrayed Memory System</u>
Demagnification ($1024^2 - 512^2$)	16 sec.	0.8 sec	0.1 sec
512^2 Fourier Transform	63 sec	3 sec	1 sec

It is noted that system response is inversely proportional to cost and power consumption and that the appropriate tradeoffs should be performed before an ultimate decision is made.

2.6 Key Points

The major points brought out in this study are:

- A single GPC can be isolated from the remaining set of four with at least three levels of error checking as insulation. This is accomplished by causing a computer to appear failed to the remaining set and would require little, if any, reverification of the system.
- Multi-experiment processing in one computer can be handled securely by an available software feature. Additional protection may be available through other means (secure operating systems, distributive processing systems, etc.).
- The Orbiter's GPC, with proper augmentation (i.e., a video generator and a high-speed experiment data memory device) can produce digital imagery in respectable response times.
- A system utilizing projected (1985-1990) technology and utilizing the GPC as the executive controller can offer shorter response times at cost and power penalties.

IBM is not recommending the use of any one system, at this point. The intent of this document was only to address the use of the GPC as a MASE component and to perform a preliminary comparison of its performance against the kind of performance which is predicted to be available from systems in the 1985-1990 timeframe.

3.0 GPC ISOLATION AND SECURITY

3.1 Description of the Problem

The GPCs in the Space Shuttle operate the Data Processing System (DPS) through twenty-four data buses which they control. Twenty-three of these buses are common to all five computers. The remaining bus is unique to each computer and goes to the Telemetry Master Unit. When operating redundantly, the General Purpose Computers (GPCs) divide up the buses so that only one GPC has command of any one bus with the others passively receiving data on that bus but issuing no commands or outputs on it. Thus, for example, for the four buses, each connected to one of the four redundant rate gyros, each GPC is issuing commands for acquiring data on one of them but is receiving data from all of them.

This arrangement gives rise to the problem of defining a way in which to absolutely isolate one of the computers from the others and devote it to DOD operations without danger of letting DOD classified data or code escape into the primary system. The problem amounts to showing how to reliably deadface all data paths between the GPC doing DOD work and the other GPCs which are operating the Space Shuttle.

3.2 Data Flow

Figure 3-1 shows the proposed configuration. The buses to be used by the DOD computer are shown (LDB, and DK-2) as well as the primary system mass memory buses. For simplicity, the other buses are not shown.

In order to understand the methodology of isolation, it is necessary to understand in some detail the data flow into and out of the GPC. The pertinent elements are shown in figure 3-2. This figure shows a portion of the Input Output Processor (IOP) in which the Multiplexed Interface Adapter (MIA) is separated from the rest of the IOP, even though the 24 MIA's (one per bus) are physically packaged into the IOP.

The process for obtaining data from a subsystem is as follows. The program in the Central Processing Unit (CPU) issues the appropriate commands to enable the transmitter and receiver by setting the appropriate bits in the transmit enable and receive enable registers. This is done via a Program Controlled Output (PCO). Each bus is enabled separately with a unique bit in the registers. Next, the Bus Control Element (BCE) must be enabled, if it is not already so, by resetting the halt bit in the status register. There is one BCE for each bus, each with a halt bit in the status register.




Figure 3-1 GPC I/O Functional Diagram

The BCE cannot execute any instructions if the halt bit is set. The PCO is used for this action. Next, the CPU tells the BCE to start and it begins executing instructions. These instructions condition the BCE by loading into its local storage a time out value and the Interface Unit Address (IUA). The time out value determines how long the BCE will wait for data to come. If the time is exceeded, an error flag will be set and the BCE stops. The IUA is the address of the unit from which the data is desired. This will be compared with each word of received data which must have the same address or the data will not be accepted.

The BCE then sends the encoder the command which causes the desired subsystem to send data. The encoder converts the command into serial manchester code, adds appropriate sync bits and parity bit and ships it onto the bus via the transmitter (which must be enabled). If the data comes back, it passes through the receiver into error checking circuitry. The sync bits are checked, the number of bits in the word are checked and parity is checked. The data is stopped at this point if the check fails and an error bit set in the status register. The BCE stops with any error indication. The data is then transferred to the MIA buffer. If the time out window has been exceeded, the data stops at this point because the BCE has turned itself off after the time out was exceeded.

If all checks have been positive, the BCE then tests the incoming bits for the correct IUA by comparing it with the previously stored IUA of the outgoing command. The data stops in the MIA buffer if the test is failed. Otherwise, the BCE stores it into the main memory. When the correct number of words has been received, the BCE either drops to a wait state or starts another Input/Output operation.

For data outputs to the subsystem, the data flow is the same as the first portion of the above (i.e., the flow of the command to the subsystem for data.)

The technique used in redundant set operation can now be explained more precisely. As an example, where there are four redundant buses for receiving the data from four redundant rate gyros, each of the four computers has control of one each of the buses. Control means that the MIA transmitter is turned on via the transmit enable register. Thus, on each of the redundant buses, one IOP has the transmitter on and the other three have only the receiver enabled. The command to the rate gyro to send data goes from the commander and all hear the data coming back. However, the data will not get into the other computers unless preparation has been made. The receivers must be on, the correct IUA must have been set into the BCE, the correct word count must be anticipated, the time-out window must be set up with appropriate time and, etc., to have these things

set up at the right time (\pm a few milliseconds) the computers must be synchronized so that the I/O tasks are started together.

The synchronization is accomplished by handshaking discrete lines between the GPCs. If synchronization is lost with any of the computers, the primary software is coded to stop receiving data on any of the buses command by the computer failing to sync (i.e., the receivers on those channels are turned off). This type of action protects the redundant computer set from bad commands and data from a failed computer.

All of the data checks described above are for the same purpose i.e., the word count, bit count, IUA, time out parity checks will stop data from getting into a GPC unless it is synchronously executing the same tasks as the computer controlling the bus.

Proof of this insensibility to spurious signals on the buses is obtained through analysis and software verification. It is treated as a safety of flight item. This proven ability of the primary system is significant to the DOD use of one of the onboard computers during orbital operations. It essentially guarantees that the primary system will not be harmed by inadvertent misuse of the DOD computer and also the same features can be used to guarantee that DOD data on the buses commanded by the DOD computer cannot be stored by any device other than the DOD computer DOD display, or DOD mass memory. The following sections will point out how this can be done by using the features just described.

3.3 Isolation Techniques

The following discussion is organized into a description of a method for starting up the DOD computer and then a description of the isolation provisions at each interface to the primary system.

3.3.1 Start Up Methodology

At the initiation of the DOD start up the selected computer will be in a powered-down state. Any of the five computers can be selected; however, it must be one of the machines not involved in the primary system which is operating the space shuttle.

Power will be applied to the selected computer and an Initial Program Load (IPL) performed using the IPL switch. The initial program will be read in from the primary system mass memory and will be the same as IPL for the primary system. When this action is complete, the DOD selected computer will be in a loose synchronization with the primary set executing Mode "O" of the primary software. A list of the next set of possible keyboard commands can be displayed under this software. One additional item must be added to this list

(currently, there are several vacant spaces) which would be the command to load a short program for reading the DOD mass memory. These two small pieces of code would be the only changes required in the primary software.

The program read in would go only to the DOD computer, and this could be checked via the display. This program would be complete except that the IUA of the DOD mass memory would be missing. This key address would be added manually to the DOD computer only via the primary system keyboard. The display could be used to check that only the DOD computer received it.

Next, the execute command would be entered and the DOD computer would load its operational program from the DOD mass memory. No other unit in the orbiter system would have the same address as the DOD memory so that the primary system can never address it, the address will not exist on the primary mass memory or in the primary computer. This is the rationale for manual entry.

At the point of reading in the DOD program, synchronization will be broken and a light will come on verifying this has happened. This reaction is already programmed in the primary software for the "fail-to-sync" condition. In addition, the primary system turns off the MIA receivers in the data bus channels assigned to the non-synchronizing GPC. This again is programmed and verified already in the primary software to guard against a failed GPC sending bad data into the redundant set. The DOD computer is now loaded with the DOD operating program which interfaces with the DOD equipments only since the IUA's of the DOD system elements are all different from any in the primary system.

3.3.2 Isolation of Data on DOD Buses

The concept, as shown in figure 2-1 is to dedicate three buses to the DOD computer. These are: the two launch data buses and the DK-2 display bus. The question addressed in this section is that of making certain that no data on these three buses can be stored in any of the primary system elements which have memory. This is of concern because the primary system elements, displays and computers are still electrically connected to these buses.

There are several protections provided. First, it is proposed that all of the DOD units have IUA's which are different from those of any primary system element. Plenty of spare addresses are available to accomplish this. The IUA check at the primary system display or GPC would then automatically reject any message sent by any element of the DOD system. The IUA of the primary system display on the DK-2 bus is hard wired via a code plug and would also be different.

Secondly, the primary display on DK-2 would be turned off.

Thirdly, the loss of sync at the outset turns off the receivers on these buses in the primary system. This can be checked if desired by a callable display format in the primary system. This stops any information at the receiver.

Finally, the lack of synchronization would make it impossible for the primary system to start the receive process at the right time. (Time-out windows would be wrong, word counts would be wrong, etc.) The above provisions give three to four levels of protection against inadvertent acquisition of DOD data by the primary system.

3.3.3 Transmission of DOD Data on Unauthorized Buses

This concern is that of the DOD computer, either through a software or a hardware failure, transmitting on buses being used by the primary system. In this case, the receivers in the primary system would be enabled.

The DOD software would be programmed to turn off the transmitters on all MIAs interfacing these buses. This would be cyclically done, say at 25 HZ. In the same manner, the BCEs would be put in a halt state. This could be checked via the DOD display, if desired.

In addition, the primary system could not receive the data anyway since no primary system IUA would be stored anywhere in the DOD system. The lack of synchronization again makes it impossible for the primary system GPC to set up the receive operation at the right time for the time out windows. If the DOD computer happened to transmit at the same time as a primary computer or subsystem on a particular bus, the parity checks, bit count checks, and sync bit checks would be failed by all of the primary system Display Sets and computers in addition to the aforementioned protective feature. The time out windows and BCE start commands in the primary system would, of course, be timed for expected data so that if DOD data arrived when the primary BCE was active it would almost certainly be intermixed with primary data and both would be rejected as noted. If it arrived when the primary BCE was not active, it would go no further than the MIA buffer.

3.3.4 Primary Mass Memory Interface

Of separate concern is the possibility of writing on the primary mass memory by mistake. In this case the protection is four deep. The DOD BCE's on the channels controlling the primary mass memory buses will be halted and the transmitters turned off. The IUA of the primary mass memory will not be stored anywhere in the DOD

System. In addition, no code to start or run the BCE controlling these channels will exist in the DOD computer program. These exact same safeguards also prevent spurious transmissions being received by the primary system display units.

3.3.5 Telemetry Interface

All of the safeguards of paragraph 3.3.4 exist in regard to inadvertent transmission to the telemetry system over the telemetry data bus. In addition, it would be possible to alter the telemetry format load so that during DOD operation the PCM master unit would not read the buffer which is dedicated to the computer selected for the DOD operation.

3.3.6 Unauthorized/Unplanned Use of DOD Mass Memory

When the DOD mass memory is not being used, it could be addressed and read by one of the primary GPC's. This normally would not happen because the primary system does not have the IUA, the transmitter is turned off, the receiver is turned off, and there is no primary program to address a mass memory on that data bus. However, at one point in the investigation, the question of sabotage was raised, i.e., illegal code planted in the primary system.

This particular sabotage threat is preventable by having the DOD software send status check commands to the DOD mass memory continuously when not using it. If any other computer managed to start the mass memory, there would be two sources of signal on the bus, i.e., the status check commands and the mass memory data words. This would cause failures in bit count checks, parity checks and sync bit checks at any MIA trying to receive the data and the data would be stopped before leaving the MIA.

3.3.7 Summary and Conclusion Regarding Isolation

In the above text each of the interfaces to equipment which can store data has been examined. For each interface, there exist at least three separate mechanisms for stopping DOD information from being received and stored. It is concluded that the system can achieve isolation. It should also be noted, from the start up procedure, that only a very small change is necessary in the NASA primary system software to get the DOD operation going. Only this change would have to be verified with the full rigor of flight critical software. The DOD programs, because of the isolation features cannot cause the primary system to malfunction and, thus, less sophisticated verification should be necessary with essentially no combined NASA/DOD verification except for the start up feature.

3.4 Effect of Synchronization

The preceding section showed that with the DOD computer operating in a non-synchronous mode, as regards the primary system, a considerable amount of isolation was gained. If synchronization was retained, part of this would be lost plus the even more important problem occurs in that as part of the synchronized set the DOD software would have considerably more ability to upset the operation of the primary computer. This would lead to requiring joint verification of the programs operating together and considerably more rigor in verification overall. These rather large disadvantages would be offset by the ability to uplink data over the existing hardware setup and to use the Master Timing Unit time base directly. There are, however, alternate means to receive uplink and address the Master Timing Unit.

3.5 TEMPEST Considerations

NASA's contract with Rockwell International does not acknowledge that the Orbiter's computers will contain DOD classified data. This stems from the original negotiations between NASA, Rockwell and DOD where the cost of full TEMPEST protection was deemed too excessive. The alternative to full TEMPEST protection was to employ sound electromagnetic interference (EMI) avoidance practices in the design of Orbiter systems with special attention to the T-Zero umbilicals, the Closed Circuit Television system and the Payload Patch Bulkhead (located at the aft station). DOD agreed to assume the risk of further modifications if these practices proved to be inadequate.

NASA and DOD are planning to perform TEMPEST testing on the Orbiter currently at Palmdale (Vehicle 099) sometime late in 1981. These tests will be performed at the Orbiter's external antennae. No "skin emanations" will be tested. If the Orbiter must be cleared for classifications above SECRET, skin emanations must be tested, also. There are no plans to perform testing between components within the vehicle.

As soon as the testing is completed, Vehicle 099 will be refurbished for orbital flight, regardless of the outcome of the testing. Vehicles 103 and 104 will be modified as needed to meet whatever TEMPEST requirements are desired. Vehicles 102 and 099 will be retrofit with necessary modifications if it is deemed necessary to have four cleared vehicles.

3.6 Multi-Experiment Support

In the isolated GPC configuration, it is an expressed desire by the STP that experiment processing and data handling be isolated by experiment within the computer. This, of course, is a problem common to all central processing architectures, GPC or not, and can be handled in a variety of ways.

A particular feature of the Shuttle language, HAL/S, allows isolation by use of the ACCESS feature designed into the language. This feature, when applied to a HAL/S program and its attendant data pool, disallows any other program from calling the protected program or accessing its data pool. (See Figure 3-2.) ACCESS-protected programs may, however, address non-protected programs and their data as shown by the arrow bridging the access protection at the right side of the figure.

Violations of access rights are diagnosed at the time the programs are compiled and cause termination of the compilation if an infraction occurs. As further protection, legitimate compilations of ACCESS-protected programs result in Program ACCESS Files established for realtime control of access rights. Each program is given a Program Identification Number (PIN) which is cross-checked in the access files during realtime.

No software measures are completely secure. The HAL/S ACCESS feature provides a measure of isolation which, under normal circumstances, should provide the necessary data processing protection. There are also other techniques currently under investigation which can increase multiprocessing security. One of these concerns secure operating systems.

Several organizations are analyzing secure operating systems such as the Strategic Air Command for use in the Strategic Air Command Digital Information Network (SACDIN). Other methods of secure and reliable software such as modularized (or distributive) systems with rigid interaction protocols are also under investigation.

3.7 Ground Systems

In addition to onboard support of sortie payloads, it may be desirable to telemeter payload-related data to the ground for analysis. Under the Controlled Mode Concept for flight control of DOD Shuttle missions from NASA/JSC, payload telemetered data would be throughput, in its original encrypted format, from the Shuttle to a remote Payload Operations Control Center via the Mission Control Center at JSC. This concept is discussed in the "MCC STS and JSC POCC Mature OPS Timeframe Level A Requirements," JSC-12804.

There are other ground-related functions which must be analyzed to ensure proper protection of DOD payloads. Examples are the use of ground systems for preflight checkout, premission and real-time mission planning, simulators and payload software development. Assessments of these functions should be made with respect to DOD sortie missions before a commitment is made by DOD for the use of the STS for sortie missions.




Figure 3-2 HAL/S Isolation Feature

4.0 Experimental Data Processing

During a sortie flight, the MASE will be expected to support certain realtime and quick-look functions required to operate experiments and assess their performance. This section addresses the typical requirements that could drive system design and considers the use of in-place equipment toward satisfying those needs.

4.1 Approach

The problem divides basically into specification of user requirements and design of the system. The approach used in this report is to first specify the requirements independent of the system design and then to configure a system to meet the requirements. In view of the objective to evaluate system capabilities, specification of the requirements concentrates on identifying typical cases, rather than attempting to establish strict groundrules. The general requirement-to-configuration process is illustrated in Figure 4-1. Since little information on the anticipated sensors was available, a model of the sensor characteristics was adopted to determine what possible data manipulations might be applicable onboard. An imager and a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) were adopted because their relatively copious outputs and anticipated processing workloads are expected to drive the overall requirements and because their processing requirements typify the types of functions expected for other sensors. The SAR outputs a quasi-image, which after application of a two-dimensional, digital integral transform, results in an image resembling in form the output of an imager. It is assumed that the imager and SAR outputs are 8-bit-values (i.e., measured to one part in 2^8). In anticipation of a wide spectrum of different image sizes, acquisition rates and data volumes, these characteristics were allowed to remain variable in the sensor model, and the requirements were established as functions of them. This approach was facilitated by considering the required workload on a per-image-element or per-pixel basis which for many cases is independent of other data factors.

The functional requirements were established by developing a scenario of sensor use. Based on available information, it was supposed that images would be selected for near-realtime viewing, that is as quickly as humanly possible. The scenario identified the six basic functions shown in Figure 4-1.

The functional requirements were then transformed into system requirements, viz. processing loads and input/output (I/O) requirements to support performance of the functions in a reasonable




Figure 4-1 Steps in The Specification Of Onboard User Requirements
And Their Impacts On System Specification

time. Then, several onboard system configurations utilizing in-place equipment were considered, and their capabilities to meet the requirements were investigated.

4.2 Data Processing Requirements

Onboard data processing must support operation of the sensors and examination of their data in near-realtime. The duty cycle to provide sensor operation and control is considered to be low enough that the capability to support these functions is not an issue. Thus, the requirements of interest are limited to the six functions identified in Figure 4-1. These functions include image inspection support and SAR image production. They require graphics overlay capabilities for interactive display and various computations performed on the image intensity values. In view of present capabilities of the Multifunction CRT Display System (MCDS), the graphics requirements can easily be met and need not be considered further.

The image processing functions are presented in the subsections below. Basically, they entail reading in the pixel-by-pixel array of intensity values, performing certain computations, and reading the resulting array of pixel values out to a storage or display unit. In determining workloads below, certain techniques, such as double buffering or data blocking, have been assumed to allow simultaneous input, output, and processing. The functional requirements must distinguish between the need for random access storage and satisfaction with block-serial storage. The latter is assumed unless the need for random access is noted below.

4.2.1 Contrast Enhancement

The display of a black-and-white image is considered. The image is represented digitally as a two-dimensional array of 8-bit words, each representing the intensity of a small element or pixel of the image frame. The basic display method consists of decoding each pixel intensity value as a visual intensity level at the appropriate spot on the screen. Due to limits in the eye's capability to resolve intensity levels, normally only about 8 to 32 levels are displayed. Contrast enhancement entails a transformation applied to the pixel values before display in order to utilize the 8, 16, 32, etc., intensity levels for best visual discrimination. A widely-used method employs a linear transformation to place a desired range of pixel intensity values in the range of the visual display. The resulting stretching of the dynamic range is interpreted visually as a greater contrast. A linear transformation requires one multiply and one add per pixel.

Another common method of contrast enhancement effects a variable stretching of dynamic range. The dynamic range is stretched the most at those pixel intensity levels represented by the most pixels. This method is used for extended imagery such as of the earth's surface. Application of histogram compensation is described in Figure 4-2. Two data passes are effected. On the initial histogram pass, the number of pixels having intensity values at or below a given value is determined, shown as an accumulative frequency vs. 8-bit value in Figure 4-2. The ordinate of that tabular function is then rescaled into divisions representing the output display intensities, such as from 0 to 15 for 16 levels. The second data pass then uses the table as the transformation function.

4.2.2 Demagnification

In the event that the incoming image is larger than the display medium, that is the image has more pixels than can be displayed at one time, either only a portion can be viewed or the pixel density must be decreased. This latter process effects a demagnification, as shown in Figure 4-3. Two methods of reducing the pixel density are in common use. One method, called "decimation" selects the pixel in every Nth column and Nth row for an N-fold demagnification. No computations beyond indexing are required for this method. The alternate method averages the N values from each NxN array of original pixels to produce the demagnified image pixels. This latter method is preferable because all the pixel values are utilized to some extent, but this advantage is obtained at the cost of computations: (N^2-1) adds and one multiply (by $1/N$) per output sample.

4.2.3 Magnification

When the size of an image, in pixels, is smaller than that of the display medium, the image is magnified by expanding the pixel density. Two alternative schemes are shown in Figure 4-4. The simpler involves repeating a pixel value N times in each dimension for an N-fold magnification. Thus, the display image will consist of blocks of NxN identical pixel values, each block representing a magnified version of the original pixel. The alternate scheme transfers adjacent pixels in the unmagnified image to positions separated by N columns and N rows in the new image. The interspaces are filled in by interpolation. To preserve resolution, cubic convolution, as presented in Reference 4-1, is employed as follows. To determine the pixel value in an interspace along a row, the two transferred pixels (crosshatched in Figure 4-4) on each side are used in a four-point weighted average. The weights are computed from a third order polynomial function of the relative distance between each transferred pixel and the interspace position. Since




Figure 4-2 Histogram Compensation For Contrast Enhancement





Figure 4-3 Image Demagnification Alternatives




Figure 4-4 Image Magnification Alternatives

there are only $(N-1)$ interspace pixels between successive transferred pixels, there are only $(N-1)$ unique relative positions, and a $(N-1) \times 4$ matrix of weights can be set up initially. After the interspaces are filled along rows occupied by transferred pixels, the intermediate rows are filled by interpolating in the column direction in the same manner. This interpolation requires about $4(1-1/N)$ multiplies and $3(1-1/N)$ adds per output pixel.

4.2.4 Image Rotation

In special circumstances, a rotation of the displayed image may be required. It is effected by first computing the position in the unrotated image of each pixel in the rotated image. If a rotation angle θ is specified, the position, in terms of the i th column, j th row, in the unrotated image is determined in terms of their counterparts i' and j' in the rotated image by

$$\begin{aligned} i &= \text{Integer} (\cos \theta i' + \sin \theta j') \\ j &= \text{Integer} (-\sin \theta i' + \cos \theta j'), \end{aligned}$$

where i , j , i' , and j' are indices with origin ($i=j=i'=j'=0$) at the displayed image center. Then, the value of Pixel i, j is transferred to Pixel i', j' in the new image. Having chosen the integer values in the equations above effectively selects the "nearest neighbor" pixels, in contrast to interpolation. Linear interpolation could be utilized or the cubic convolution of the previous section employed, but onboard quick-look needs do not seem to warrant that rigor. Because of the non-linear sequence of i and j resulting from a linear sequence of i' and j' , random access is required in transferring pixel values. Access can be accommodated by first loading the whole unrotated image into random access memory or loading workable segments of the image, sequenced to yield a workable sequence of segments in the rotated image. This latter alternative, though economical in memory space, is less efficient because overlap of the segments is required to insure getting all the pixel values.

4.2.5 Fourier Transform

Interest has been expressed in being able to generate a two-dimensional Fourier transform of an image onboard. It is accomplished by computing the transform of each row of pixel values to generate intermediate arrays of real and imaginary parts. The transform of each column of the paired real and imaginary arrays is then computed to obtain two transformed images corresponding to the real and imaginary parts, respectively, or the amplitude and phase, respectively. If the fast Fourier transform algorithm is used, an n -point transform requires $2n \log_2 n$ real multiplies and adds. When

the n rows of transforms and their repeats along the n columns are considered, it is apparent that $4 \log_2 n$ multiplies and adds per sample are required. Random access of storage is required, but the transform can be accomplished in blocks to reduce random access storage at the expense of increasing somewhat the operations required.

4.2.6 Synthetic Aperture Radar Image-Forming

The raw SAR image requires a two-dimensional deconvolution to obtain the image. Either a straightforward digital filter process can be utilized, or the raw image can first be Fourier transformed, each element of the resulting "image" multiplied by a stored function, and the result inverse-transformed. The latter method is described, along with the application of certain corrections, in Reference 4-2. The computation workload estimated in Reference 4-2 for the SEASAT-A SAR can be applied to images of other sizes by noting that the preponderant computations are Fourier transformation and that roughly a 60% margin in the raw image in excess of the dimensions of the processed image is required. The result is that about $49 \log_2 n$ multiplies and adds per output pixel are required to obtain an n -row by n -column image.

After a SAR image is formed, it is subjected to the same functions as any other imagery.

4.2.7 Requirements Summary

The operations workloads required to implement each function were given in the previous sections. They may be expressed in terms of General Purpose Computer (GPC) utilization by estimating the time required to execute the operations. The GPC code was constructed to unpack 8-bit pixel values from 16-bit half-words, effect a linear transformation, and repack for output, and the time to execute the resulting code was determined. For other functions, this time estimate was augmented by the appropriate number of add and multiply intervals. The resulting processing times and the operations workloads are presented in Table 4-1. The omission of a workload figure denotes the fact that the process does not require any excess time when combined with other processes. For example, decimation will probably always be combined with contrast enhancement. Whenever the computations proceed faster than the input or output rate, the GPC is I/O bound, and that fact is noted by the appropriate limiter (input or output) in Table 4-1. Input-bound processes are so limited because there are fewer output pixels, and the converse is true for output-bound processes. Histogram compensation is bound by two I/O's because two passes, each requiring an input, are effected. The other processing rates are

Table 4-1 Requirements Impacts On Processing

	PROCESS	OPERATIONS (PER SAMPLE)	PROCESSING TIME*
CONTRAST ENHANCEMENT	{ LINEAR TRANSFORMATION	1 ADD, 1 MULT	I/O-BOUND
	{ HISTOGRAM COMPENSATION	2 INDEXINGS	2 x I/O
DEMAGNIFICATION	{ DECIMATION	**	INPUT-BOUND
	{ BLOCK AVERAGING	3 ADDS, 1 MULT	INPUT-BOUND
MAGNIFICATION	{ SAMPLE REPEATING	**	OUTPUT-BOUND
	{ CONVOLUTION INTERPOLATION	3 ADDS, 4 MULTS	2½ x OUTPUT
	FOURIER TRANSFORM	4LOG ₂ N ADDS, MULTS	16 x I/O
	SAR IMAGE-FORMING	49LOG ₂ N ADDS, MULTS	205 x I/O

*DETERMINED BY CONSTRUCTING GPC CODE FOR LINEAR TRANSFORM AND AUGMENTING FOR OTHER PROCESSES (MAJOR SOURCE OF OVERHEAD IS BYTE PACKING/UNPACKING)

**COMBINES WITH OTHER PROCESSES




Figure 4-5 Baseline System

expressed in terms of I/O rate for clarity. The processing for convolution interpolation requires $2\frac{1}{2}$ times as much time as input of the data. Fourier transformation and SAR image-forming require considerably longer. To reconsider these processes in units of time, note that the GPC I/O time is 16 microsecond per pixel on the average.

4.3 Processing Systems Configurations

To meet the requirements imposed in the previous section, several onboard data system configurations are considered, representing a system adhering to in-place equipment and augmentations by additional equipment.

4.3.1 The Baseline System

The system employing in-place equipment alone is presented in Figure 4-5. The experiment transmits selected data directly to the GPC while recording all data on its own medium. Imagery is displayed by the MCDS by driving the CRT with the Display Electronics Unit (DEU) alone. Although the DEU generates displays in a graphics mode only, intensity levels can be displayed by a judicious choice of symbols coded in the graphics generation software.

The DEU display is driven from a refresh buffer of about 1,500 words. When characters are to be displayed at random positions, three words are required per character; therefore, about 500 characters can be displayed. When characters are uniformly arranged only one-half word each is required for most of them, and considerably more than 500 can be displayed. However, the time required to stroke characters on the screen, together with the requirement to repeat the display 55 times a second, restricts the number of characters to about 1,300, which can accommodate a small image of about 36x36 pixels. These capabilities are illustrated in Figure 4-6. Apparently, the baseline system is limited to either small images of extended objects, as might be generated by a high energy detector or low resolution imager, or to celestial images limited to about 500 celestial point objects (stars, satellites, etc.). In view of the angular density of stars as a function of their magnitudes (Reference 4-3), the 500-star limitation corresponds, for example, to a field limited to about 4 degrees square when imaging stars down to 12th magnitude, and to a field of about 1 arc min. square when imaging to 24th magnitude.

4.3.2 Video-Augmented System

The bottleneck in the baseline system is caused by the DEU, and the first logical augmentation is to provide another video generation




Figure 4-6 DEU Capability For Image Display

system, as shown in Figure 4-7. An additional memory device is inserted with a readout rate high enough to drive the CRT. A candidate design employing disk storage is discussed in Section 5. The video generator effects a digital-to-analog (D/A) conversion to produce a signal resembling the video available from the onboard Closed-Circuit Television (CCTV) network. To supply a raster of about 500 lines with a bandwidth equivalent to about 500 samples per line, the refresh buffer must accommodate about 250,000 words or about 2 megabits.

In this system, the GPC generates the display image, and it becomes the bottleneck.

4.3.3 Buffer-Augmented System

Even for simple image manipulations, the GPC limits the capability in the previous system by its own image storing capacity and by being able to input only about 5×10^5 bps from an experiment. Then, the experiment's output rate would need to be limited to that value. This limitation is lifted by inserting a buffer between the experiment and GPC, as shown in Figure 4-8. Selected images are written to the buffer at the experiment's output rate, possibly as high as 100 M bps, and they are read into the GPCs at its rate of $\frac{1}{2}$ M bps. The buffer's transfer rate must accommodate high experiment rates, and again a parallel arrangement of the disk units described in Section 5 can be used.

In this configuration, the GPC processing and I/O rates still limit the system's capability in terms of the time required for handling the images, but data incompatibilities with the experiment and display limitations have been removed.

4.4 GPC-Oriented System Response

By responding to image-handling limitations with the introduction of the configurations of the previous section, the overall system limitation has been consolidated in the response capability. If it is assumed that buffers are added as needed for the GPC-CRT and GPC-experiment interfaces, the system response for different experiment output rates and different processes is shown in Figure 4-9. Response functions are plotted for images of 512×512 and 1024×1024 pixels. For low data rates the response is limited by the time taken to transfer an image through the system. As the data rate increases, the response time decreases until a horizontal boundary, established by the GPC processing or I/O rate, is reached. For example, Fourier transforming a 1024×1024 -pixel image requires about 4 minutes in the GPC, regardless how fast the experiment can output the data. The lowest boundaries are reached when the GPC's




Figure 4-7 Video-Augmented System




Figure 4-8 Buffer-Augmented System




Figure 4-9 GPC Response As A Function Of Experiment Data Rate

I/O restricts the flow of data through the system. This limit is reached at about $\frac{1}{4}$ M bps.

Figure 4-10 presents the response in terms of image size. Two data rates are shown, corresponding to 1 K bps and the GPC I/O-bound rate of $\frac{1}{4}$ M bps. Process-limited responses are shown for Fourier transformation, SAR image-forming, and convolution interpolation used for image magnification. In the latter case, the image size applies to the output image. The SAR processing and Fourier transform functions slope differently from the others because of their dependence on $\log_2 n$ for an $n \times n$ image. Figure 4-10 indicates that a 1024x1024-pixel image requires about 16 seconds minimum to pass through the system, about 40 seconds for convolution interpolation, about 7 minutes for Fourier transformation, and about 1 hour for SAR image-forming.

The overall capability of the GPC-oriented system is summarized in terms of experiment data rate and image size in Figure 4-11. For a given tolerated response time, the experiment's data rate and image size must lie on or below the lines corresponding to the response tolerance. For example, if a 10-minute wait time is acceptable, a 1024x1024-pixel image can be accommodated for any rate above about 15 K bps. If SAR processing is to be done in 10 minutes, the image cannot exceed about 500x500 pixels; whereas, Fourier transformation can accommodate an image a little larger than 1024x1024 pixels in 10 minutes. The I/O-bound limits put absolute ceilings on the image sizes.




Figure 4-10 GPC Response As A Function Of Image Size




Figure 4-11 Image Size - Data Rate Tradeoff

5.0 HIGH RESPONSE SYSTEM

The systems discussed in Section 4 utilized the Orbiter's GPC as the central processing unit. In those cases that probably represent typical DOD experiment data processing requirements (e.g. digital imagery), the GPC was the pacing unit in terms of system response time. In this section, we will investigate a system augmented by advanced technology processors in lieu of the GPC in an attempt to improve the response time of the system.

A survey of the space processor technology which is anticipated in the STP sortie timeframe will be given in general terms and a candidate system constructed. This system is not intended to be a recommendation, but merely an example of a reasonable-cost, reliable system which may be available in the 1980's.

5.1 Microprocessor-Augmented System

Figure 5-1 illustrates a typical system where the GPC has been replaced by a space microprocessor. The GPC does, however, retain the role of a central executive processor which controls the interaction of the other units in the system. It has been determined, incidentally, that such a configuration - dedicated microprocessors with a central controller - is the most probable system of the future.

In this system, the experiment feeds the desired images to the Selected-Image Buffer at the experiment rate. A microprocessor will extract data from the buffer at a rate such that the data processing can be performed and the processed data placed in the video refresh buffer without causing input data "pile-up" in the processor. It will, therefore, be an objective of this process to choose technologies which provide the best system matching rather than individually selecting the components with the most impressive performance.

It is also noteworthy that the microprocessor-augmented system with the GPC as the master controller retains the flexibility of the GPC's interactive features while removing the security concerns present when the GPC directly handles experiment data.

5.2 Technology Overview

Two types of systems were considered in this brief technology projection - memories (for the Selected-Image Buffer and the video refresh buffer) and microprocessors.

Figure 5-2 illustrates a tree of memory technologies encompassing moving surface memory devices and entirely-electronic memory devices. The former includes tape disk, and drum while the latter is made up of random access memories (RAM), read only memories (ROM), serial access devices (which emulate moving surface memories, but have no moving parts) and tunnel technology. This




Figure 5-1 Microprocessor-Augmented System




Figure 5-2 Memory Technologies

list is by no means exhaustive, nor will a treatise of the various technologies be given; but relevant factors such as cost, speed, volatility and capacity were considered in designing a representative system.

Two terms must be defined before analyzing memories. They are:

Access Time - the average time required to access any element of the memory

Cycle Time - the rate at which data may be entered into or removed from memory.

5.2.1 Memories

For random access memories, access time and cycle time are the same. That is, each datum must be sought out (since the data are stored randomly) and removed for output. Although this may seem inefficient, RAMs are the fastest memories currently available.

Serial access devices, both moving-surface and entirely-electronic, may require longer access times (the time required to position the device to the beginning of a string of data) than RAMs, but the cycle rate (input/output data transfer rate) is generally much quicker. Tape recorders, for example, may have average access times on the order of seconds and cycle rates of 10^7 bits per second. Cycle time, therefore, seems to be the more meaningful parameter and will be used in the analysis of storage devices.

Other factors which should be considered in the choice of memories are cost, volatility, power and radiation resistance. These will be mentioned in the analyses.

Figure 5-3 presents the current access time averages for various memory technologies. As described earlier, the more exotic devices, RAMs, require much less time to access a random element in memory than the slower (but less expensive) serial access devices. The dashed ellipses represent 1985 projections for bubble memories. The upper ellipse demonstrates expected performance and cost for bubbles which are intended to replace RAMs. The lower is bubble technology designed to replace disk and drum devices. It should be noted that these cost comparisons hold for bubble memories storing up to 10 million bits. Moving-surface devices become more cost advantageous at higher storage capacities.

A more meaningful measure of capability for the storage of serial data is cycle (or data transfer) time. Figure 5-4 presents this parameter against cost and the cost advantage is demonstrated even more dramatically with disk, tape and bubble memories comparing favorably with RAMs. Another factor is shown in this figure, also. RAM technology is usually volatile. That is, if

CURRENT TECHNOLOGY




Figure 5-3 Access/Cost Comparisons




Figure 5-4 Cycle Time/Cost Comparisons

if power is lost to the memory, then the device does not retain its contents. The serial access devices are nonvolatile, retaining their memory contents during power loss. One other factor (not shown) is that the fastest RAMs are usually silicon technologies. Silicon is very susceptible to incident radiation, making its use in space somewhat risky unless due hardening is built in. Gallium arsenide is a suitable replacement for silicon but results in devices not as fast as silicon RAMs. As might be expected, the volatility of the RAMs requires constant refreshment of the memory and drives the power consumption proportionately higher.

5.2.2 Microprocessors

Microprocessor technology for airborne and spaceborne applications is expected to spawn some very capable devices in the 1980s. As Figure 5-5 illustrates, increases in speed (measured in millions of instructions per second) of an order of magnitude will emerge. Centralized processors (uniprocessors) will be improved upon by 4-unit multiprocessors (quad technology) and associative array processors. The spread of the curves representing a particular technology demonstrates the different speeds at which a microprocessor can perform its various functions (add, retrieve, multiply, etc.). This is clearly demonstrated in the associative array processor where search (or retrieve) is about an order of magnitude faster than a typical mix of arithmetic operations.

Military and space constraints in hardening, reliability and power have caused actual capabilities to lag somewhat behind previous predictions. It should also be noted that airborne processors will tend to be faster than spaceborne processors using the same technologies due to similar reasons. The stringent power requirements probably dictate the use of low-speed/power technology such as complementary metal-oxide semiconductors.

Currently, four government agencies are supporting advanced signal processor development: 1) DARPA and SAMS0 are jointly sponsoring advance study work; 2) Langley Research Center is analyzing charged-couple device (CCD) analog signal processors; 3) Goddard is planning to develop a Massive Parallel Processor for LANDSAT; and 4) JPL is doing likewise for SEASAT. Progress in these fields may eventually eliminate the disparity of airborne and spaceborne computer speeds causing the curves on Figure 5-5 to converge more rapidly.

5.3 Microprocessor-Augmented System

Using the above projected technology overview, we can now functionally design a system which would be responsive to the nature of experiments assumed in this report.

Beginning with the Selected-Image Buffer, Figure 5-6 presents a disk storage system which can respond to the 100 MBPS input rate




Figure 5-5 Air/Space Computer Projections




Figure 5-6 Prototype Disk Memory

assumed for imaging experiments and can output at any rate up to the input rate. Disk technology was chosen for its relative speed with respect to tape and its low cost as evidenced by Figure 5-4. Bubble technology was not considered as a viable candidate now as too little is known to produce the same level of detail as for disk. Secondly, an earlier discussion revealed that bubble memory cost increases dramatically if the total storage exceeds 10 million bits. Our particular scenario requires 5 frames of 1024 x 1024 pixels of 8 bits each or about 40 million bits. Typical specifications of this system are:

Storage	- 10^8 bits
Input Rate	- 100 MBPS
Weight	- 20 lbs.
Volume	- 0.7 cu. ft.
Power	- 75 watts
Availability	- early 80s

This, of course, is a multiple disk, multiple read head configuration which brings the data transfer rate up to the desired 10^8 BPS as opposed to the projected $0.5-1 \times 10^7$ BPS rate on Figure 5-4. Multiple bubble memories could be paralleled as well to produce fast I/O rates.

With this in mind, it would seem that the I/O rate could be increased without bound then the pacing element would be the speed with which the processor could handle the data. If we conservatively chose the 4-unit multiprocessor curve on Figure 5-5, we find that 1985 technology for spaceborne processors would yield a 20 MOPS device. Similar calculations can be performed for other years.

On the other hand, we might assume the use of a single unit storage device for less stringent problems with a microprocessor which is matched in speed to the storage device. If we assume this single storage device to be a bubble memory of average predicted speed, we are bound by the data transfer rate as before (with the GPC) and can also be bound by the computational speed in the case that a speed-matched microprocessor is used.

Figure 5-7 illustrates the system response time for a microprocessor-augmented system. The solid lines represent a single bubble memory device for the Selected-Image Buffer with a speed-matched microprocessor. The dashed line represents a system where parallel systems are utilized for the Selected-Image Buffer such that the microprocessor becomes the pacing element. The microprocessor speed is then extracted from Figure 5-5, 4-Unit Multiprocessor (Space). It is clear in comparison with Figure 4-9 that substantial savings can be produced using predicted space systems technology.




Figure 5-7 Microprocessor-Augmented System Performance

6.0 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

The use of the Orbiter's General Purpose Computers as an element in a Manned Aerospace Support Equipment system has been analyzed from two aspects. The first scrutinized the security risk in isolating one of the computers from the other four. The second investigated the response of a GPC-oriented system to several typical experiment processing requirements. Augmentation of the GPC-originated system was discussed to render it applicable to the various experiments.

6.1 Security

On the security issue, it was concluded that measures which are already built into the NASA system could be taken to isolate a single computer from the others with at least three levels of testing (error checking) insulation in all areas. By simply causing the computer to be "out of sync" with the others (a condition which would occur in the NASA system if one computer failed), precautions are taken by both the isolated computer and the remaining set to insulate one from the other. Various minor precautions (e.g., a unique, hand-entered identification number for the DOD Mass Memory) can be taken to further secure the system.

It was further concluded that, although TEMPEST testing was not to be conducted internal to the Orbiter, the Orbiter's Data Processing System should easily conform to all emanations testing.

Likewise, the handling of data and processing software from several experiments simultaneously is provided for in the current Shuttle language (HAL/S).

It was also noted that the use of a double encryption baseline, where encrypted payload data is interleaved with Orbiter telemetry data and encrypted again by the Orbiter before being telemetered to JSC, may relieve any ground systems concerns. Under this system, NASA/JSC would decrypt the telemetry stream (leaving the payload data encrypted) and route the payload data to a remote Payload Operations Control Center causing payload operations to be functionally independent of the "Controlled Mode" concept.

Some areas for further analysis include the ramifications of pre-flight checkout on security (a problem common to both the isolated GPC concept and a dedicated MASE system concept), the use of a sixth GPC at the aft station in lieu of isolating one of the standard five and the use of specialized equipment under GPC control. Software security measures may also be investigated, such as secure (multi-level) operating systems, modular software systems with rigid protocol, fault-tolerant systems and improved, reliable languages.

6.2 System Response

After having generated data processing requirements for typical experiments in which, it is assumed, the STP would be interested, the response of a GPC-centered computer system (necessarily augmented by other components) was analyzed. A particular experiment - the storing of high-speed digital imagery data on an intermediate buffer and the subsequent display of this 1024×1024 8-bit pixel image in a 512^2 format - could be supported in about 16 seconds. The same experiment which further required a Fast Fourier Transform to be performed on the data could be processed in approximately one minute. These times seem reasonable for the purpose, but may be substantially improved by replacing the GPC as the data processing element with specialized micro-processors (as predicted to the 1985 timeframe). Times for the 1024^2 to 512^2 demagnification and the 512^2 Fast Fourier Transform could be reduced to 0.1 seconds and 1 second, respectively, if technology predictions are accurate.

There are, of course, several tradeoffs that should be conducted before a faster, more exotic system is recommended. On the one hand is the speed of response offered from systems anticipated for space technology, while on the other is the reliability, relatively low cost and guaranteed Shuttle program support offered with use of the Orbiter's Data Processing System. Cost, power, logistics, software development and testing, simulators and other factors must be considered.

IBM is not recommending any one method. This decision can only be made when definitive data processing requirements are delineated and the impact of satisfying those requirements evaluated. It is recommended that the proper action be taken to perform these evaluations as the cost of necessary changes to the NASA system (provided any are required) may mount with time.

7.0 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

BCE	Bus Control Element
BPS	Bits Per Second
CCD	Charge-Coupled Devices
CCTV	Closed Circuit Television
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CRT	Cathode Ray Tube
cu. ft.	cubic feet
D/A	Digital to Analog
deg.	degrees
DEU	Display Electronics Unit
DK	Display/Keyboard
DOD	Department of Defense
EMI	Electromagnetic Interference
exper.	experiment
FC	Flight Control
FOV	Field of View
G	Giga (10^9)
GPC	General Purpose Computer
hr.	hours
IBM	International Business Machines Corporation
I/O	Input/Output
IOP	Input/Output Processor
IPL	Initial Program Load
IUA	Interface Unit Address
JPL	Jet Propulsion Laboratories
JSC	Johnson Space Center
K	Kilo (10^3)

KBPS	Kilobits per Second
LANDSAT	Land Satellite
lbs.	pounds
LDB	Launch Data Bus
M	Mega (10^6)
mag.	magnetic, magnitude
MASE	Manned Aerospace Support Equipment
MBPS	Megabits per Second
MCDS	Multifunctional CRT Display Station
MDM	Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
MIA	MDM Interface Adapter
min.	minutes
MMU	Mass Memory Unit
MOPS	Megaoperations per Second
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NRZ	Non-Return-to-Zero
PCI	Program Controlled Input
PCO	Program Controlled Output
proc.	Processing
RAM	Random Access Memory
ROM	Read Only Memory
SAR	Synthetic Aperture Radar
SEASAT	Sea Satellite
sec.	seconds
STP	Space Test Programs
STR	Standard Test Rack
Xform	Transform

8.0

REFERENCES

- 4-1 Bernstein, R., "Digital Image Processing of Earth Observation Sensor Data," IBM Journal of Research and Development, 20, pp 40-57, January 1976.
- 4-2 van de Lindt, W. J., "Digital Technique for Generating Synthetic Aperture Radar Images," IBM Journal of Research and Development, 21, pp 415-432, September, 1977.
- 4-3 Hurt, W. E., James, D. A., Kidd, R. H., Rice, W. C., Simpson, R. S., van de Lindt, W. J., and Wolfe, R. H. "Ground Support Requirements for Selected Shuttle Payloads," IBM Federal Systems Division, Houston, August 1975, revised June 1976.